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Introduction 
The purpose of this submission is to bring to the attention of Dr Slorach, as the appointed 
reviewer, various issues associated with the way in which NZFSA has dealt with the 
issue of A1 and A2 milk.   
 
This submission needs to be read and considered in conjunction with two other sets of 
material.  The first is the book ‘Devil in the Milk’ which I authored and which was 
published in September 2007 (Craig Potton Publishing).  The second is the 17 page 
working document dated 7 October 2007, authored by me and analysing the behaviours 
of NZFSA in relation to the release of the Swinburn Report, and already supplied to Dr 
Slorach on 23 January 2008.  That October 2007 document, which is titled ‘The Role of 
the NZFSA in Investigating Health Issues Concerning A1 and A2 Milk’, is based on 
NZFSA correspondence obtained from the NZFSA under the Official Information Act. 
 
In writing this current document I have been conscious of not unnecessarily repeating 
material already presented in either the book or the October 2007 document.  
Accordingly, I emphasise the importance of taking those materials fully into account.  
 
In writing this current document I am also influenced by the discussions held between Dr 
Slorach and myself on 23 January 2007.  In particular, there were perspectives presented 
by Dr Slorach in those discussions which seem to require a response.  
 
I recognise that those 23 January discussions were held at an early stage of the review 
before Dr Slorach had a full opportunity to assess all of the information.  However, I do 
express concern at the apparent role being played by NZFSA within this review, and of 
the influence NZFSA can bring to bear, given that NZFSA is itself the subject of the 
review.  I am particularly aware of the opportunities that NZFSA has to present its slant 
on events.  Given the NZFSA track history in regard to the A1/A2 saga, I therefore 
suggest to Dr Slorach that he is cautious of accepting NZFSA perspectives without 
external corroboration that he has indeed been supplied with all relevant information.  
 
During our January discussions, it became apparent that NZFSA had not supplied Dr 
Slorach with my document of 7 October 2007.  Dr Slorach sought confirmation that 
NZFSA had indeed received this document which was sent to the Minister on 7 October 
(and also to selected media) and we had some conversation around that.  In confirmation, 
I now note that the document did indeed reach NZFSA, either directly or indirectly, given 
that NZFSA in their press release of 8 October made explicit reference to this document 
and alleged flaws within it.  I make these points simply to clarify that NZFSA have had 
access to this document. I have no particular interest in pursuing further whether NZFSA 
did or did not supply these materials to Dr Slorach as part of the review materials. 
 
Finally in relation to this introduction, and as a consequence of an element within our 
conversation of 23 January, I draw Dr Slorach’s attention to the final paragraph on p13 in 
the introduction to my book about academic freedom and how academics represent 
themselves and not their university.  It would be very unusual for a NZ university to have 
a formal position on a matter such as A1 beta casein and my university has no such 
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position.  What I write, both then and now, is on behalf of myself as an academic within 
the Agriculture and Life Sciences Division of Lincoln University. 
 
The focus of the Swinburn Review 
The initial decision in 2003 to appoint an independent consultant to review safety issues 
associated with A1 and A2 beta-casein was a decision made by the NZFSA itself.  
Whether or not NZFSA was the most appropriate agency to undertake such a review 
might be debated.  I do not choose to debate that point.  However, I do make the point 
very strongly that having decided to undertake such a review then the agency had very 
clear responsibilities to do so in a manner that was objective and totally independent of 
any existing stance in relation to milk nutrition. They also had a responsibility to then 
communicate Professor Swinburn’s review accurately to the public.  They also had a 
responsibility to communicate the findings to other relevant government agencies, given 
that no other government agency would be likely, in the circumstances, to undertake its 
own review in relation to these issues. 
 
A key starting point is to note that the 2003 Swinburn review (which, following review 
was released in August 2004) was titled ‘Beta-casein A1 and A2 in milk and human 
health’.  The terms of reference were headed : ‘Review of research relevant to A1/A2 
milk’, and included the requirement to ‘evaluate the implications of such research’.   It 
was not a review of whether or not milk is nutritious.   
 
If it had been a review of whether or not milk is nutritious then it would have required a 
totally different set of terms of reference to those that were supplied.  The responsibility 
of NZFSA was therefore to communicate the findings of the report in relation to the risk 
factors relating to A1 and A2 beta-casein.  
 
It is relevant to note here that to the best of my knowledge no-one associated with the A1 
and A2 debate has ever questioned whether or not milk is nutritious.  Indeed it can be 
taken as a clear starting point that milk contains many nutritious elements.  The question 
therefore is not whether or not milk is nutritious, but whether or not there are specific risk 
factors relating to A1 beta-casein which is present in the milk of some cows.  These 
points are of particular relevance to term of reference (v) of the Slorach Review. 
 
The existing stance of NZFSA 
It is very clear that NZFSA had an existing stance in relation to milk bring nutritious and 
an important component of the diet.  It is also very clear that NZFSA perceived that the 
issue of A1 beta-casein posed a threat to that stance.  This perception may have been 
linked to misunderstanding both as to the existing number of pure A2 cows available in 
NZ (more than 1,000,000, with no more than 10% of these required to supply the total 
fresh milk requirements of all New Zealanders) and also in relation to the practicality of 
converting the rest of the NZ herd to A2.  In regard to this issue of conversion, I draw 
attention to a statement from LIC, the dominant supplier of dairy semen to the NZ dairy 
industry, on p23 of their industry publication of “Your Choice” of Spring 2007. 
“LIC could, within 48 hours, respond to a market directive to move to A2 milk (i.e. 
only put A2 bulls forward for collection). This would mean that, within eight to ten 
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years, virtually every cow in New Zealand would be A2.  This shift – if directed by 
consumer demand – could be done without compromising other genetic qualities.” 
 
Regardless of why NZFSA had such a stance in relation to milk, there is no doubt from 
its own documentation that it did have such a stance.  This is not simply a matter of 
interpretation.  NZFSA has itself been explicit that it had and has a stance. 
 
This raises the generic issue of whether or not there is potential conflict within the 
NZFSA charter to ‘protect and promote public health’.  Having a requirement to 
‘promote’ public health leads inevitably to having a stance on a range of matters.  A 
potential problem then arises when that stance descends into naivety such as saying that 
‘milk is safe’.  The reality, of course, is that it is difficult to name a single food product 
which is safe for all people in all circumstances and in all quantities.  The potential 
problem then becomes a very real problem when specific events and findings challenge 
the accuracy of these naïve statements.   
 
There are two possible responses in dealing with the above problem.  The first is to 
separate the role of ‘protecting’ from that of ‘promoting’ public health.  There would 
indeed seem to be a tenable argument that the Ministry of Health is the best placed 
institution within NZ to undertake promotion of nutritional behavioural aspects of public 
health.  That would then leave NZFSA with the role of protection, which they could then 
do uncluttered from the need to have public health stances related to nutritional 
behaviour.  Alternatively, if the ‘protect and promote’ functions are to stay within the 
same agency then there is a clear need for higher standards of training within NZFSA as 
to how to deal with the potential for conflicts within these roles.  I make no suggestion as 
to which of these paths should be followed.  But I do say very clearly that NZFSA has 
shown itself as currently lacking the necessary skills to manage its existing charter. 
 
The Swinburn message 
The key message from Professor Swinburn was on of ‘uncertainty’. He identified a lot of 
evidence but he did not find, in his opinion, that there was proof.   
 
Professor Swinburn did not say anywhere in his report that ‘milk was safe’.  He has 
subsequently stated in the media that this decision not to state that ‘milk was safe’ was 
purposeful.   
 
Professor Swinburn also said in his report that more research was needed.  He reinforced 
this message several times, including stating (p6) that ‘the appropriate government 
agencies have several important responsibilities’ relating both to further research and 
communicating the current state of knowledge. 
 
Given a report of more than 40 pages there is considerable scope for taking messages out 
of context.  I therefore chose in my book to quote the last three paragraphs of the Lay 
Summary.  I did this because it provides a linked series of statements, which by definition 
reduces the potential of changing an author’s message through use of non sequential 
statements.  Also, my choice was influenced by the logic that the concluding statements 
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that an author makes can indeed be assumed to be important statements of conclusion.  I 
regard these paragraphs as sufficiently important that I repeat these three paragraphs here. 
 
The A1/A2 hypothesis is both intriguing and potentially very important for population 
health if it is proved correct.  It should be taken seriously and further research is needed.  
In addition, the appropriate government agencies have a responsibility to communicate 
the current state of evidence to the public, including the uncertainty about the evidence.  
Further public health actions such as changing dietary advice or requiring labelling of 
milk products, are not considered to be warranted at this stage.  Monitoring is also 
required to ensure that any claims made for A2 milk fall within the regulations for food 
claims. 
 
Changing the dairy herds to more A2 producing cows is an option for the dairy and 
associated industries and these decisions will undoubtedly be made on a commercial 
basis.  Changing dairy herds to more A2 producing cows may significantly improve 
public health, if the A1/A2 hypothesis is proved correct, and it is highly unlikely to do 
harm. 
 
As a matter of individual choice, people may wish to reduce or remove A1 beta-casein 
from their diet (or their children’s diet) as a precautionary measure.  This may be 
particularly relevant for those individuals who have or are at risk of the diseases 
mentioned (Type 1 diabetes, coronary heart disease, autism and schizophrenia).  
However, they should do so knowing that there is substantial uncertainty about the 
benefits of such an approach. 
 
 
Descending the slippery path. 
The key NZFSA message in releasing the Swinburn report was that all milk was safe.  
The opening statement in their press release (dated 3 August 2004) was: 
Consumers are advised to keep drinking milk as a nutritious food, no matter 
whether it’s A1 or A2, as there is no food safety issue with either type of milk. 
 
It was this simple and clearly inaccurate message that the majority of media picked up as 
their headline message.  A few media, but only a few, presented a message that more 
accurately reflected the tenor of Swinburn’s report.  However, to do this they had to go 
past the NZFSA press release and read the report in some detail as the Lay Summary was 
not included in the released materials. 
 
I note that in our discussions of 23 January Dr Slorach put forward a suggestion, which 
NZFSA have themselves put forward, that the omission of the Lay Report did not result 
in the non release of any information.  This argument goes along the lines that a Lay 
Summary cannot include information that was not in the main report (including the 
Executive Summary).  At one level that is true, but what a Lay Summary does is bring 
together in clear non technical language the key messages. 
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Those of us (including NZFSA Communications staff) who work with the media 
understand very clearly the importance of the 15 second sound bite and its print media 
equivalent.  That 30 word opening statement from NZFSA was the key statement which 
captured the message that the general public received.   
 
The key issue with the omission of the Lay Summary is therefore not that it precluded 
access to information by those who wished to seek out that information in some detail.  
But its absence made it much harder for those who wished to point out to the general 
public the fundamental differences between the message of the Swinburn Report (one of 
uncertainty) to that of the NZFSA (‘no food safety issue’).  
 
The reality is that most media relied on the 307 word NZFSA press release (or elements 
thereof), the tone of which was set by its 30 word opening statement.  If the media had 
access to the 499 word Lay Summary, then those who accessed this Summary would 
have immediately recognised the incongruity between what Swinburn said and what the 
NZFSA portrayed him to have said.  In particular, the 225 word concluding statement 
from this Lay Summary provided succinct evidence that the NZFSA interpretation was 
false.  Of course the media did have the opportunity to read the full report, and within 
that they would have found a 919 word Executive Summary that set out the key findings, 
although much less succinctly, and less starkly from the perspective of the general public 
than in the Lay Summary.  However, the reality is that most media did not do that, and 
those of us with media and communications experience would have predicted that in 
advance. 
 
I note that the question of the Lay Summary receives explicit mention in the terms of 
reference for the review being undertaken by Dr Slorach.  I will therefore make some 
further comments about the initial non release of the Lay Summary in this submission, 
but without going into all of the detail set out in my October 2007 document.  But before 
doing so I wish to emphasise that the issue of the Lay Summary must not be considered 
in isolation.  It was simply one element of the communication strategy in relation to 
release of the report. 
 
One element of that strategy goes right back to the initial advice to Professor Swinburn 
by NZFSA’s Carole Inkster that: ‘In relation to discussion of the precautionary principle 
our preference would be to not discuss it as the precautionary principle – this term has 
all sorts of baggage associated with it (especially European baggage).’ 
 
Subsequently there was confusion around the decision to release the report at a time when 
Professor Swinburn was unavailable to comment.  NZFSA apologised to Professor 
Swinburn for this decision, saying that it was based on a misreading of a message from 
Swinburn.  But they were aware of this mistake prior to the actual release.  They decided 
not to put back the release date a few days (which would seem inconsequential relative to 
the more than 12 month delay since Swinburn had initially delivered his report).  And 
Carole Inkster on behalf of NZFSA then opined in an email to Professor Swinburn  
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‘we did not believe that [your unavailability] was a distraction in so far as the 
media were not able to engage on points of science unnecessarily and potentially 
beat up the issue” 
This is an absolutely amazing statement which tells a remarkable story as to the 
arrogance of the NZFSA. 
 
A key issue in relation to the release of the Swinburn review is that NZFSA portrayed the 
outcomes in manner that involved ‘spin’.  I use that word purposefully given that it is the 
word that Professor Swinburn himself used when writing to NZFSA expressing 
disappointment at the way they had released his report. One could use stronger words. 
 
The fact that Professor Swinburn wrote to NZFSA, subsequent to the release of the 
report, and characterising their actions in this way, clearly gave NZFSA an opportunity to 
re-assess their position.  They chose not to do so.  Indeed those subsequent comments of 
Professor Swinburn would not have come into the public arena if it were not for my 
obtaining them through an Official Information Act disclosure.   
 
In correspondence to NZFSA following the release of the report, Professor Swinburn also 
made his position very plain once again in regard to the uncertainty, and in language that 
could not be misconstrued, by using the illustration that if he were the parent of a diabetic 
child, and was becoming the parent of another child, then he would wish to use A2 milk 
based on the potential benefit in relation to the potential cost.  Such a statement cannot be 
reconciled with the NZFSA position that there is ‘no food safety issue’. 
 
I will now return briefly to the issue of the release of the Lay Summary, but emphasising 
once again that this issue must be considered in the overall context of NZFSA’s 
behaviours in relation to the Swinburn Report.  In particular, if the NZFSA had put out an 
accurate press release then the implications of omitting the Lay Summary would have 
been less.  
 
NZFSA’s Carol Barnao, wrote to me on behalf of NZFSA on 12 August 2004 when 
NZFSA released the Lay Summary to me under the Official Information Act.  She stated 
that the Lay Summary was not included “as we feel that the tone is inconsistent with the 
main report.” 
 
This is one of several reasons that NZFSA has given for not releasing the Lay Summary 
at that time.  Others have included (from Carole Inkster on Radio NZ) that it was not 
released because it was not part of the contract.  (However, NZFSA records - which I 
hold having been obtained under the Official Information Act - show that one of the 
reviewers had specifically requested that such a Lay Summary be included, and Professor 
Swinburn wrote the Lay Summary in response to that request).  Another public response 
has been that it was not necessary as people could read the full report. (This required a 
judgement from NZFSA that the peer reviewer was wrong in requesting this).  Yet 
another response from Carole Inkster to the media has been that NZFSA can do what it 
likes in regard to what it does and does not release. 
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I am inclined to the view that Carol Barnao’s response was indeed honest.  One does not 
make up a statement like that from nowhere.  What it shows is that NZFSA was indeed 
making its own judgements (either with or without external influence from elsewhere) as 
to what should be made available to the public.  The other explanations were made in a 
futile attempt to cover the tracks.  Of course if there were a perceived difference in tone 
between the Lay Summary and the main report, and the NZFSA thought the difference 
was serious, then NZFSA should have gone back to Professor Swinburn and sought 
clarification and confirmation that the written words in each case did indeed truly 
represent his position. 
 
I note that the NZFSA points out (and does so repeatedly) that the Lay Summary is now 
available on their website.  This is correct.  But it only went up there once I had gained 
public release through the Official Information Act, and following several refusals to 
release it.  By then the damage had been done.  And NZFSA still continues to publicly 
assert that there is no food safety issue and fails to acknowledge that its message is at 
odds with Professor Swinburn’s Report.   
 
Process flaws relating to the Swinburn Review and its terms of reference 
The terms of reference (TOR) for the Swinburn review were flawed.  It is not explicit 
from the Swinburn TOR as to whether or not the science relating to beta casein, and 
particularly the peptide beta-casomorphin7, were to be part of the review. 
 
My own interpretation is that they should have been assumed to be included within the 
stated TOR.  However, it is clear from perusal of correspondence between Professor 
Swinburn and NZFSA that there was agreement that they were not to be included.  This 
was a huge flaw of process, and NZFSA must bear a large part of the responsibility.  It 
meant that the relevant biochemistry and pharmacology were totally ignored.  However, 
it is this pharmacology and biochemistry, both in vitro and in vivo, that provides 
fundamental understanding.  Perusal of the correspondence shows that NZFSA was 
alerted to the importance of the underlying science by A2 Corporation, and this occurred 
while Professor Swinburn was at an early stage of his review.  Whether or not this was 
communicated to Professor Swinburn is unclear (but the supposedly complete record of 
correspondence supplied under the OIA includes nothing to this effect).  What is clear is 
that Professor Swinburn made it clear to NZFSA as to the approach that he was taking, 
and that NZFSA was satisfied with this approach.   
 
It is widely understood that major illnesses with which A1 beta-casein is implicated are 
auto–immune in character and tend to have long latency periods.  Conducting clinical 
trials for such diseases is highly problematic.  To use just one comparable example for a 
long latency disease, if we insisted on double blind clinical trials as the only method of 
showing that smoking causes cancer, then we would still be saying that the relationship 
between smoking and cancer is inconclusive.  It is often only by combining epidemiology 
with underlying science and animal trials that the causation can be ‘proven’ as that term 
is usually understood.  
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I note that the Swinburn TOR are dated March 2003 on the NZFSA website.  However, 
NZFSA correspondence shows that NZFSA were indeed fine tuning the TOR well 
beyond this date, and that Professor Swinburn’s contract was not finalised for several 
months thereafter.  Therefore there is no reason why the underlying science could not 
have been included. 
 
NZFSA’s actions in the period following 13 September 2007 
The TOR for Dr Slorach’s review do not explicitly include the ongoing actions of 
NZFSA since the release of my book in September 2007.  However, TOR (vi) relates to 
issues of transparency and communication of decisions in regard to A1and A2 milk.  
Although this TOR has a qualification in regard to ‘in particular’, it is important that this 
is not interpreted as ‘exclusively’.  The issues that I am about to refer to do indeed 
therefore fit very clearly under the criteria of ongoing communication in relation to A1 
and A2 milk. 
 
NZFSA has chosen to continue to attack any suggestions that A1 beta-casein is relevant 
to human health.  For example, on 13 September 2007 NZFSA released a press release 
denigrating my book, but had to then admit to the media that NZFSA had not at that time 
sighted the book. (It was not in general circulation until the following day).  Right from 
that date its officers have asserted that I have brought forward no new science.  This is 
despite the fact that my book draws on more than 30 peer reviewed papers published in 
2004 and thereafter. (None of Swinburn’s references are dated later than 2003, and some 
of the 2003 papers discussed in my book would also not have been available at the time 
Swinburn’s review was submitted for peer review.)  In all, Professor Swinburn references 
38 research publications whereas in my book I present information from well over 100.   
 
In fact there are three 2007 NZFSA press releases on the NZFSA website (13 September, 
24 September and 8 October) that attempt to denigrate the evidence I have brought 
forward, and which do so by attacks that both misconstrue my position and also focus on 
attacking my credibility rather than debating the evidence.  This is unacceptable 
behaviour. 
 
In fact the NZFSA was given the opportunity to debate the evidence with me at a forum 
in Wellington organised by the NZ Royal Society in conjunction with New Zealand’s 
National Museum, Te Papa, as part of their Science Direct program.  NZFSA officers 
were unwilling to engage in debate, and it has been suggested to me by Dr Slorach that 
perhaps this was because they are not experts in the science.  Fair enough.  But if they 
lack the expertise to debate the science, then they also lack the expertise to make the 
denigrating comments via their website. 
 
Returning to these press releases (which remain on the website), the 13 September press 
release restates the false messages of the previous NZFSA press release of August 2004.  
The 13 September press release also states that “we are not aware of any new research 
from anywhere in the world”.  The most favourable judgement that one can put on such a 
statement is that it is made from a state of total ignorance. 
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Carole Inkster also stated on TV1 on 14 September that if there had been more research 
then Professor Swinburn would have informed the NZFSA.  This was a nonsense, given 
that Professor Swinburn had no ongoing relationship with NZFSA in relation to A1/A2, 
and had, as he had informed me just days previously, not been working in this field since 
the time of his review more than three years previously.  To tell untruths such as this is 
totally unprofessional. 
 
I could go on (and on!) describing the way that NZFSA has continued to reinforce its 
existing position, and to attack my position by misrepresenting that position.  But instead 
I will quote briefly from the NZFSA website (last accessed 3 February 2008) which states 
in the lead in statement to the A1/A2 section: 
“There is insufficient evidence to suggest any link between milk protein 
consumption and heart disease and insulin-dependent diabetes.” 
If this statement is correct then NZFSA might like to explain why the International 
Diabetes Federation has invited me to present a plenary paper, organised as a public 
forum, at their forthcoming Western Pacific Congress.  (And I have other invitations 
from scientific organisations to present papers at their conferences.)  Would this be 
occurring if there was no merit in the information I have been putting forth?  Quite 
simply, NZFSA loses all credibility by continuing to take such an extreme position as 
that the evidence is insufficient to even ‘suggest’ a link.   
 
Industry relationships 
In my document of 7 October 2007 I laid out the issues of NZFSA having strong but 
informal links with particular sections of industry, and the dangers and inherent uneven 
handedness associated with this.  I will not traverse the same ground here.  However, I 
will refer to one recent example which occurred at the time of announcing the Slorach 
Review, which suggests that NZFSA continues to be influenced, either knowingly or 
unknowingly, by groups that are less than independent. 
 
At that time (early to mid October 2007) NZFSA Director Dr McKenzie made a number 
of comments to media along the lines of ‘burying the issue once and for all’ through the 
proposed review.  It was notable that his major concern seemed to be with maintaining 
the public credibility of his organisation rather than dealing with NZFSA’s failings in an 
objective manner.  As part of that ongoing attempt to defend NZFSA’s position, and to 
buttress his own position, he referred to a review paper by Professor Truswell which he 
said he happened to have on his desk.  Exactly how Dr McKenzie’s attention happened to 
have been drawn to this particular partisan paper is unclear, but there are essentially two 
alternatives.  The first is that he had read my book, in which case he would have known 
that Professor Truswell was closely associated with Fonterra as a consultant on A1/A2.  
Indeed Professor Truswell has now admitted himself (Dairy Exporter of Dec 2007) that 
he was a paid consultant for Fonterra in relation to providing advice on the A1/A2 issue.  
Dr McKenzie would also have known from my book that Truswell was a witness for 
Fonterra in its unsuccessful attempt to challenge an A2 Corporation patent. To have 
singled out this one paper in the knowledge of those circumstances would have been 
highly inappropriate.  The other alternative is that Dr McKenzie had not read my book 
and the evidence therein, nor indeed conducted his own review of the literature which 
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would have informed him that this was a partisan and discredited paper.  If this were the 
case then it can only be that partisan industry-related sources had ‘fed’ this particular 
paper to Dr McKenzie without Dr McKenzie knowing that he was being manipulated.  
Either way, this incident does not reflect well on the NZFSA and its relationships with 
industry. 
 
The key issue is that this specific example, plus many outlined in my document of 7 
October 2007, are all part of a consistent pattern of unprofessional behaviour that places 
defence of an existing stance above objective analysis and communication. 
 
The defence that NZFSA’s position is consistent with other international food safety 
and health organisations 
The reality is that to date the issue of A1/A2 milk has not been considered by other 
international authorities.  The reason that this issue has come to the fore within New 
Zealand before other countries is that much of the key research has taken place in New 
Zealand.  It is also in New Zealand that one group of commercial interests have sought to 
capitalise on this research, and another group have sought to denigrate it.  This has 
included false statements and non disclosure of key research data as outlined in my book, 
and at least one partisan paper written by at an individual who had relevant non disclosed 
industry associations.  The stance of NZFSA has itself contributed to the challenges of 
getting these issues debated objectively on the international stage.   
 
Moving forward 
In essence there are two options. 
 
Option 1 is that NZFSA continues to deny the findings of their own reviewer, Professor 
Swinburn, and continue to deny that there have been significant flaws in the way they 
have implemented their own risk management procedures.   If they persist in going down 
that track then they will simply bury themselves (and not just ‘bury the issue’ as their 
CEO stated in the media).  Quite simply for the sake of their own credibility they have to 
admit to their shortcomings. 
 
Option 2 is therefore to admit that mistakes have been made, show that NZFSA is a 
learning organisation, and move forward.  If this is to occur then at the very least there is 
a need for enhanced training programs within NZFSA to better equip NZFSA staff to 
deal with the complexities of food safety issues and the uncertainties that surround these 
issues.  In particular, the NZFSA personnel need considerable training in how to deal 
with matters of non certainty and the precautionary principle.  They need to learn that 
giving messages of certainty where no such certainty exists is a recipe for organisational 
disaster.  They have to learn to be transparent in advising consumers of the state of 
knowledge (as in this case determined by their own reviewer) and including the 
uncertainties.  And they need to learn how to engage in constructive debate. 
Organisationally, they need to reflect on the dangers of organisational spin and 
organisational public relations that involves massaging of situations.  Not only scientists, 
but bureaucrats working in scientific organisations (such as NZFSA) need to understand 
the principles of scientific integrity.  This includes remaining open to the possibility that 
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existing stances need modification.  Indeed a scientist who loses the scepticism to 
regularly reassess his or her own position, and to act accordingly, is no longer a scientist. 
 
It is also apparent that NZFSA need training in how to deal with commercial interests in a 
way that is proper and balanced.  It is highly inappropriate for NZFSA to be dealing 
informally with some groups in industry and formally with other groups.  In particular, 
given the situation in NZFSA where some personnel are former industry employees, 
there is a need for specific training as to how former allegiances and relationships with 
former industry colleagues need to be handled.  
 
As the final point, NZFSA must admit freely and publicly that the processes they used 
associated with the release of the Swinburn Report, and including their own press 
releases, have obfuscated the message to the public in relation to Swinburn’s message re 
risk factors associated with A1 and A2 milk.  Regardless of the rationale for this 
obfuscation, and the causes thereof, the obfuscation itself must be admitted. 
 
 
**** 
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